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NOTES
ARBITRATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS:
THE LOWER COURTS EXTEND
GILMER V INTERSTATE/JOHNSON LANE CORP
TO INCLUDE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose a hospital hires a new physician and the parties execute an
employment contract. Paragraph twelve of the agreement contains an
arbitration provision requiring that all disputes between the parties must be
submitted to binding arbitration. Before the contract expires, the hospital
discharges the physician. Believing she is a victim of discrimination, the
physician files suit in federal court against her former employer. To her
chagrin, she faces a Motion to Compel Arbitration of the statutory claims.
Must she resolve her discrimination claims through arbitration?'
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.,2 submission of an individual employee's 3
statutory discrimination claims to arbitration did not bar a subsequent suit
in federal court.4 However, in Gilmer the Court enforced an arbitration
agreement and concluded that an arbitrator's resolution of an age discrimi-
nation claim' precluded resort to a judicial forum.6 The arbitration
1. This hypothetical is based on Crawford v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232 (D.N.J.
1994). In Crawford, West Jersey Physician Associates ("WJPA"), P.A., hired Carolyn S. Crawford,
M.D., as the Medical Director of the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. Id. at 1234. When WJPA hired
Crawford, she signed an employment contract that contained an arbitration clause. Id. at 1234-35.
Before the contract expired, West Jersey fired Crawford. Id. at 1235. Crawford filed suit and asserted
several claims, including claims for sex and age discrimination. Id. The court granted West Jersey's
motion to stay the civil action pending arbitration. Id. at 1244.
2. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3. This Note analyzes arbitration agreements in individual employment contracts. Agreements to
arbitrate under collective bargaining agreements fall beyond the scope of the Note. For an explanation
of collective bargaining agreements and why they are excluded from the Federal Arbitration Act, see
infra note 10.
4. For a brief discussion of the Supreme Court's approach to statutory discrimination claims prior
to Gilmer, see infra notes 27-49 and accompanying text.
5. The ADEA provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29
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agreement in Gilmer appeared in a U-4 form, a document employers use
to register employees with stock exchanges, including the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE"). 7 The U-4 form is separate from the employment
contract, which governs the employer-employee relationship. Subsequent
decisions have extended Gilmer to compel arbitration of employment
discrimination claims under arbitration clauses in individual employment
contracts.8
Employment contracts differ from commercial and labor agreements
under which courts typically uphold arbitration. Employment contracts do
not involve commercial parties acting through arms length negotiation to
resolve contractual disputes.9 Nor do they involve unions collectively
bargaining for their members.' ° Despite these differences between typical
U.S.C. § 623(a)(I) (1994).
6. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
7. As required by his employment, Gilmer registered as a securities representative with several
stock exchanges, including the NYSE, by filing a "Uniform Application for Securities Industry
Registration of Transfer," which is known as a "U-4 form." Id. at 23. Gilmer's form stated that he
'"agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy' arising between him and Interstate [his
employer] 'that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organizations
with which [he] register[ed]."' Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. In Gilmer, the Court noted that "NYSE Rule 347
provides for arbitration of '[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and any member or
member organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such registered
representative."' Id.
8. See Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct.
638 (1994) (holding that the 1991 Civil Rights Amendment's provision for a jury trial does not evince
a congressional intent to preclude arbitration); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932,
935 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that an arbitration agreement in an employment application required the
employee to arbitrate claims for sexual harassment and gender discrimination under Title VII); Maye
v. Smith Barney, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 570, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that arbitration agreements in
employment contracts encompass civil rights claims); Gateson v. ASLK-Bank, N.V./CGER-Banque
S.A., No. 94 Civ. 5849, 1995 WL 387720, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1995) (concluding that
discrimination claims are arbitrable); Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1242
(D.NJ. 1994) (holding that the FAA covers arbitration agreements in individual employment contracts
and compels arbitration of discrimination claims); Hull v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303, 306 (E.D. Mo.
1993) (explaining that Title VII claims, like ADEA claims, are subject to arbitration); DiCrisci v.
Lyndon Guar. Bank of New York, 807 F. Supp. 947, 952 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that the arbitration
agreement in an employment contract mandated arbitration of employee's Title VII claims).
9. In his Supreme Court brief, Gilmer distinguished "business-oriented" claims from employment
disputes, because the former do not implicate statutes "designed to provide minimum substantive
guarantees to individual workers." Brief for Petitioner at I1, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991) (No. 90-18). For a similar conclusion with respect to claims under the Federal
Employees Liability Act, see Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 564 (1987)
(holding that a railroad employee bringing suit under the Federal Employees Liability Act cannot be
compelled to arbitrate, even though Railway Labor Act provides for arbitration).
10. A collective bargaining agreement is an "[a]greement between an employer and a labor union
which regulates [the] terms and conditions of employment." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 263 (6th ed.
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arbitration agreements and arbitration agreements in employment contracts,
in Gilmer, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA")" governs an arbitration agreement in an
individual employment contract.' However, lower courts subsequently
1990). The agreement "is enforceable by and against [the] union in matters which affect all members
or large classes of members, particularly ... employees." Id. Courts agree that § I of the FAA excludes
collective bargaining agreements as "contracts of employment." See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); see also
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987); Bacashihua v. United
States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 404-05 (6th Cir. 1988).
11. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988 & Supp. 1991). The Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"), 7 U.L.A. 5
(1985) has been adopted completely or with some modifications by 26 states and integrated, with some
changes, in other state arbitration statutes, including those of California, Michigan, New York, and
Texas. MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCItAL ARBITRATiON § 4.02, at 41 (Gabriel M. Wilner ed.,
rev. ed. 1995). Issues relating to state law and the UAA are beyond the scope of this Note.
12. Section 1 of the FAA states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.' 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
The dissent in Gilmer asserted that the FAA excludes arbitration agreements in both individual
employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 41-42. The dissent
explained that the location of the arbitration agreement, whether in a U-4 form or an employment
contract, should not change the result. Id. at 40. The majority, however, did not address the exclusion
issue for two reasons: first, Gilmer did not raise it; second, the arbitration agreement fell within the U-4
form rather than the employment contract. Thus, the Court did not need to discuss the issue in order
to reach its decision. Id. at 25 n.2.
Many courts define the language of § 1 as limited to workers actually engaged in interstate
transportation or "in work so closely related ... as to be in practical effect part of it." Tenney Eng'g,
Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. Local 437,207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953); see
also Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9,739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984);
Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. duPont,
443 F.2d 783, 785 (Ist Cir. 1971); Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 351 F.2d
576, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1965); Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, 235 F.2d 298, 301-02 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957), reh g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am.,
218 F.2d 948, 951 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'don other grounds, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Scott v. Family Farm
Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 76, 77-78 (D. Mass. 1993); Dancu v. Coopers & Lybrand, 778 F. Supp. 832,
833-34 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd mem., 972 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Management Recruiters Int'l,
765 F. Supp. 419, 421-22 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
These courts rely on the legislative history of the FAA. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452-53. When Congress
debated the language of the FAA, the Seamen's Union asserted that seamen's wages come under
admiralty jurisdiction and should not be subject to arbitration agreements. Id. at 452 (citing W.H.H.
Piatt et al., Report of the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial, 48 A.B.A. REP. 284, 287
(1923)). The drafters responded by adding the § I exclusionary clause for seamen and railroad workers,
the two groups of transportation workers for which Congress had already created special arbitration
legislation. Id. Thus, the drafters "rounded out the exclusionary clause by excluding all other.., classes
of workers [similar to seamen and railroad workers]." Id. at 453.
A small minority of courts have held that § 1 excludes employment contracts, concluding that the
FAA cannot be applied to such contracts. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305,
311 (6th Cir. 1991); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 7 F.3d 1110, 1119 (3d Cir.
1993) (noting in dicta that the FAA does not apply to employment contracts); United Elec., Radio &
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enforced such arbitration clauses.'3 Thus, an individual employee can
waive the right to a judicial forum and a jury trial and agree to send
statutory employment discrimination claims to arbitration.' 4
This Note examines the judicial extension of Gilmer. Part II discusses the
historical development of contractually mandated arbitration and its
intersection with federal civil rights statutes. Part III explains the Gilmer
decision and its effect on the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Part
IV discusses courts' extension of Gilmer to include individual contracts of
employment and outlines the debate regarding enforcement of such
arbitration agreements in the employment context. Finally, Part V supports
the extension of the Gilmer doctrine and proposes procedural safeguards to
further protect an employee's substantive civil rights under arbitration. This
proposal allows parties to enjoy the benefits of arbitration while addressing
the perceived weaknesses of arbitration procedures.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACTUALLY MANDATEP
ARBITRATION AND ITS INTERSECTION WITH EMPLOYEE
CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES
Arbitration is a voluntary process of dispute resolution in which the
parties choose a private judge to evaluate the evidence presented at a
hearing and to grant relief.'5 Arbitrators may be selected by the parties
themselves, appointed pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration
Association, or designated by a court. 6 Both parties agree in advance
upon the procedural rules the arbitrator will follow and agree 7 that the
Mach. Workers of Am. v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954) (holding that an
arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement fell outside the scope of § 1). These courts
support the position adopted by the chairman of the ABA Committee responsible for drafting the bill:
The FAA "is not intended [to] be an act referring labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the
merchants the right or privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages
are, if they want to do it." Id. (quoting Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923)).
13. See supra note 8.
14. Based on the Supreme Court's analysis in Gilmer, it appears that almost all types of statutory
claims, employment-related or otherwise, would be subject to binding arbitration. See William M.
Howard, The Evolution of Contractually Mandated Arbitration, ARn. J., Sept. 1993, at 27, 33. Howard
argues that nonunion employers will soon routinely use predispute arbitration agreements. Id. at 34,
15. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990). See also FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A.
ELKOURI, How ARBrrRATION WoRKs 2 (4th ed. 1985).
16. See DOMKF, supra note 11, §§ 20:00-20:01, at 301-03. (discussing how arbitrators lre
appointed).
17. ELKOURI & ELKOUI, supra note 15, at 2. Though the decision is binding, courts may vacate
an arbitrator's award under some circumstances. See, e.g., infra note 265,
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decision will be binding.'"
Congress enacted the FAA' 9 in 1925 to overcome judicial hostility
toward arbitration and place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing
as other contracts. 20 The FAA establishes arbitration clauses as "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."2'
For almost thirty years following the enactment of the FAA, no court
decided a significant reported case involving the statute.' Beginning in
the 1950s, however, courts started to distinguish between contractual and
statutory rights.' While the courts considered private contractual rights
suitable for arbitration, they concluded that because some statutory rights
implicate public rights, their resolution should be reserved for the courts. 24
This "public policy" exception"5 to the FAA kept a judicial forum open
to parties despite the existence of a binding arbitration agreement.26
18. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 15, at 222. Numerous trade and professional associations
follow the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") procedures. See DOMKE, supra note II § 2:02,
16-17. The AAA also promulgates special rules for arbitration of employment disputes. AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASS'N, EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES (1993) (pamphlet) [hereinafter EDR
RULES].
19. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883-86 (1925) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994)).
20. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924). Refusal to uphold arbitration agreements
dates back to the courts of England, which viewed "irrevocable arbitration agreements as 'ousting' the
courts ofjurisdiction, and refused to enforce such agreements for this reason." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974) (citing H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924)). "This
view was adopted by American courts as part of the common law up to the time of the adoption of the
Arbitration Act." Id.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
22. Search of WESTLAW, Ailfeds database (Mar. 29, 1996).
23. See Note, Agreements to Arbitrate Claims Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
104 HARv. L. REv. 568, 570 n.19 (1990) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434 (1953) (refusing
to find a waiver ofjudicial forum in a dispute encompassing the Securities Act of 1933)); Hanes Corp.
v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 593-94 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (refusing to uphold an arbitration agreement in a
patent dispute); Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968)
(allowing resolution in a judicial forum despite existence of an arbitration agreement in an antitrust
dispute).
24. Note, supra note 23, at 570.
25. Id. Courts supporting the public policy exception have held that some statutory rights are
important "not only to the parties but also the public at large." Id. These courts refused to send statutory
claims to arbitration but agreed that arbitration "may be appropriate for contractual rights." Id.
26. See Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability ofAgreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public
Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481 (1981). Sterk argues that courts should not enforce arbitration
agreements when they are "the product of unequal bargaining power, or of unequal transaction costs
that make it likely that one party will draft an agreement that the other will sign without first
questioning or reviewing the agreement's arbitration clause." Id. at 486-87.
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In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,27 the Supreme Court upheld an
employee's right to judicial resolution of his Title VIP8 claims even
though an arbitrator had previously dismissed the claims. The Court
reasoned that statutory and contractual claims are separate and distinct
causes of action, especially in the context of employee civil rights.29 Each
claim, according to the Court, has an "independent origin" and is equally
available to the aggrieved employee.3 ° Thus, statutes such as Title VII
"supplement rather that supplant existing laws"'" and an employee cannot
prospectively waive the right to judicial resolution of Title VII claims.32
In support of its holding, the Court outlined four reasons why arbitration
is inappropriate as the final method of resolving Title VII claims. First, the
Court argued that labor arbitrators have neither the experience nor the
authority to resolve Title VII claims.33 Second, the Court, concerned about
27. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The employee in Alexander filed a grievance under the union collective
bargaining agreement alleging, but not explicitly claiming, racial discrimination. Id. at 39. The arbitrator
ruled that the employee was "discharged for just cause," and the employee subsequently brought suit
in federal court under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. Id. at 42-43. The District Court held
that the arbitrator's decision precluded the suit and granted summary judgment for the employer. Id.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994). Title VII provides that:
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
29. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47-49.
30. Id. at 52.
31. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 48-49. Under the Court's reasoning, Title VII plaintiffs would not face
an election of remedies problem. Id. at 49. The mere fact that the employee agrees to arbitrate his
contractual disputes does not mean that he must similarly submit to binding arbitration of his statutory
claims.
32. Id. at 51. The Supreme Court held that in the collective bargaining context, there can never
be a prospective waiver of an individual employee's rights under Title VII. Id. However, the Court
recognized that an individual employee could waive a Title VII cause of action as part of a voluntary
settlement. Id. at 52.
33. Id. at 52-53, 56-57. The Court explained that the arbitrator, in making his decision, must look
to the collective bargaining agreement as his sole source of authority. Id. at 53. The arbitrator must
decide the dispute by interpreting the intent of the parties as expressed in the collective bargaining
agreement and has no "authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain of the parties." Id.
When an arbitrator reaches a decision inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement, courts must
not enforce the arbitrator's award. Id. (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
[VOL. 74:443
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the relative informality of arbitration procedures, found arbitration fact-
finding procedures inadequate protection for employees' Title VII rights.34
Specifically, the Court noted that an arbitration proceeding record generally
did not constitute as complete a representation as a trial record. Further-
more, the Court emphasized that the usual rules of evidence do not apply
to an arbitration proceeding.35 Also, procedures utilized in civil trials, such
as "discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under
oath are often severely limited or unavailable."36
Third, the Court noted that arbitrators are under no obligation to give
reasons for their decisions.37 Presumably, the Court worried that such a
practice shields the decision from public or judicial scrutiny and deprives
subsequent arbitrators and judges of the precedential value of the opinion.
Finally, the Court expressed concern about the "union's exclusive control
over the manner and extent to which an [employee's claim] is present-
ed."3 Inherently, the collective bargaining process subordinates the rights
of an individual employee to the interests of all employees in the
bargaining unit.39 Moreover, the union's interests may not always align
with those of the individual employee, especially if the union itself is
discriminatory. Thus, an employee may find it difficult to establish a breach
of the union's duty of fair representation.40
Subsequent decisions, resting on similar concerns, upheld Alexander's
protection of statutory civil rights in the employment context.4 ' In
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,42 the Supreme Court allowed
employees to submit Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") claims brought
34. Id. at 57.
35. Id. at 58. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in arbitration proceedings. When
arbitrating employment claims, parties often follow the AAA EDR Rules, see supra note 18, which give
the arbitrator discretion to allow discovery upon request of the parties. For a discussion of the EDR
RULES, see infra note 245.
36. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57-58 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956);
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-37 (1953)).
37. Id. (citing United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. 593, 598)).
38. Id. n.19 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddon, 379
U.S. 650 (1965)).
39. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57-58 (citing J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944)).
40. Id. (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342, 348-51 (1964)).
41. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (holding that giving
preclusive effect to arbitration awards in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions would "severely undermine the
protection of federal rights that the statute is designed to provide."); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 732 (1981) (concluding that courts should not defer to an arbitrator's decision on
issues involving "minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers").
42. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
449
Washington University Open Scholarship
450 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 74:443
pursuant to the union's collective bargaining agreement to a judicial forum
after an arbitrator had rejected the claims.43 The Court reasoned that
statutes designed to provide "minimum substantive guarantees" to
individual workers involve special concems." Under FLSA, for example,
employees cannot waive or otherwise contractually limit their rights to
minimum wage and overtime pay.45 Moreover, FLSA requirements
preempt conflicting provisions in a collectively bargained compensation
agreement.46 The Court explained the four concerns it discussed in
Alexander and added a fifth concern: Arbitrators are often unable to award
as broad a range of relief as judges in the civil court system.47 Specifical-
ly, FLSA authorizes courts to award actual and liquidated damages,
attorneys fees, and costs. 48 However, an arbitrator can generally award
only the compensation authorized by the collective bargaining agree-
ment.49
In a trilogy of cases that included Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.," Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,5" and Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.,52 the Supreme Court reversed the longstanding presumption against
arbitration of statutory claims.53 In its 1985 Mitsubishi decision, the Court
adopted a policy requiring rigorous enforcement of private agreements to
arbitrate54 and expressly supported a strong presumption in favor of
43. Id. at 730.
44. Id. at 737.
45. Id. at 740.
46. Id. at 740-41.
47. Id. at 745.
48. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).
49. Id.
50. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
51. 482 U.S. 220 (1987), reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
52. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
53. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625. In
addition to its decisions upholding arbitration, the Supreme Court has rejected claims that civil rights
statutes always deserve special treatment. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (explaining
that evidence did not show that "Congress, in considering § 1988, had any thought that civil rights
claims were to be on any different footing from other civil claims insofar as settlement is concerned");
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 542 (1982) (holding that a "dual court system is not
established simply because civil rights remedies are different from those available in other areas").
54. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-21
(1985)). The Supreme Court has also invalidated state laws limiting the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. In 1984, the Court struck down a California law because it undercut the presumption of
arbitrability created by the FAA. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (citing 9 U.S.C.
§ 2). The Court reasoned that Congress intended for the FAA to apply "in state as well as federal
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arbitration.5" The parties in Mitsubishi raised one claim involving antitrust
violations under the Sherman Act.56 The defendant argued that its
statutory rights under the Sherman Act could not be submitted to binding
arbitration.57
The Court rejected the defendant's argument and explained that the FAA
fails to provide a basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims, unless, in the statute itself, Congress expressly prohibits a waiver
of a judicial forum.58 Instead of characterizing the agreement as a waiver
of substantive rights, the majority described an arbitration agreement as a
forum selection clause under which a party agrees to resolve the dispute in
"an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum."59 The Court concluded that
courts should only refuse to enforce agreements to arbitrate statutory claims
if the agreement "resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming
economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any
courts." Id. at 15-16. In addition, the Court held that the California law violated the Supremacy Clause
of Article Six of the United States Constitution because it undermined the FAA presumption of
arbitrability. Id. at 16.
55. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625 (supporting a presumption of binding arbitration) (citing Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)). For other decisions
supporting a presumption of arbitrability, see Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (holding that "arbitration under the act is a matter of
consent [and that] parties are ... free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit");
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,239 (1987) (enforcing parties' agreement
to arbitrate and explaining that Mitsubishi upholds a strong presumption of arbitrability), reh'g denied,
483 U.S. 1056 (1987); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1960) (supporting arbitration agreements between parties); Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that claims under the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act are subject to binding arbitration). But see Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express,
Inc., 871 F.2d 292, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that statutory ERISA claims are not subject to
binding arbitration because Congress intended that plan participants and beneficiaries be able to seek
protection in a judicial forum, particularly a federal court).
56. 473 U.S. at 619-20.
57. Id. at 621. The defendant alleged that "Puerto Rico law precluded enforcement of an agreement
obligating a local dealer to arbitrate controversies outside Puerto Rico."
58. Id. at 627-28.
59. Id. at 628. Some commentators argue that employees are free to make choices regarding their
rights to a judicial forum. See G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When
is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute"for the Courts?, 68 TEx. L. REv. 509, 567 (1990).
Justice Stevens, writing the dissenting opinion in Mitsubishi, presents an argument based upon the
expectations of the parties. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 650. According to Stevens' argument, lawyers and
employees, especially executives, would not expect arbitration clauses to cover statutory claims because
arbitration usually occurs in the context of commercial or labor dispute and courts have repeatedly
distinguished between statutory and contractual rights. Id. Based on Stevens' argument, it would be
unfair to deny a judicial forum for resolution of statutory claims if the parties never intended arbitrators
to resolve such claims. See id.
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contract.""'
The Court also dismissed the defendant's argument that arbitration
procedures are inappropriate for resolving complex statutory claims.61 The
Court reasoned that parties can select arbitrators based on their expertise.62
The court stated that appointing an arbitrator who is very familiar with the
statute at issue makes arbitration more adaptable than civil litigation.63
Further, arbitration allows for a more expedient resolution of disputes and
avoids "the monstrous proceedings" that give litigation "an image of
intractability. 64
Two years after Mitsubishi, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,65 the Supreme Court established a two-prong test ("McMahon
test") for determining whether parties should arbitrate.66 First, the Court
must examine the text of the statute and the legislative history to determine
if Congress intended to exclude statutory claims from the FAA. 67 If
neither the text nor the legislative history of the statute clearly shows
Congress' intent to override the FAA, the Court must determine whether
there is an "inherent conflict ' 6 between arbitration and the statute's
underlying purpose.69 If no congressional exemption exists, the FAA
mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.70
Further, the burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show that
60. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).'
61. Id. at 633-34.
62. Id. at 633.
63. Id. (noting that "adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration.").
64. Id.
65. 482 U.S. 220 (1987), reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
66. Id. at 226-27. The McMahon test refined the analysis used by the Court in Mitsubishi. The
Mitsubishi Court first determined whether the arbitration agreement encompassed the statutory issues.
473 U.S. at 628. If it did, the Court secondly considered whether external legal constraints, such as
fraud, illegality, or overwhelming economic power, should bar arbitration. Id.
The McMahon test is more favorable to arbitration than the Court's analysis in Mitsubishi. A legal
constraint, such as overwhelming economic power, would be easier for plaintiffs to show than a
standard requiring plaintiffs to "demonstrate that Congress intended to make an exception to the
Arbitration Act for claims arising under [a statute.]" McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
67. Id.
68. Id. It appears that the Court intended to construe the "inherent conflict" standard narrowly. See
id. at 227-42. The Court established such a strong presumption in favor of arbitration that plaintiffs
would presumably have to show a very clear congressional statement of intent in order to override the
presumption. See Note, supra note 23, at 586 (concluding that the inherent conflict standard should be
narrowly construed).
69. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
70. Id. at 226.
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Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial forum under the
statute.71
The McMahon Court held that the plaintiffs were bound by their
arbitration agreement to submit their claims under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO") to binding arbitration.72 The Court rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that the Exchange Act's language precludes binding
arbitration. 7' The section at issue, section 29(a), declares void "[a]ny
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance
with any provision of [the Act.] 74 The plaintiffs argued that section 29(a)
prohibits waiver of section 27 of the Exchange Act, which provides that
federal district courts "have exclusive jurisdiction [over] ... all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created
by this Chapter. '75 The Court held that the statutory language of section
27 is insufficient to show a congressional intent to preclude binding arbitra-
tion.76
The Court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that there is an
irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and the underlying purposes of
RICO.7 7 Citing Mitsubishi, the Court stated that the mere complexity of
RICO does not render the statute inappropriate for arbitration, because
arbitration is flexible enough to allow appointment of arbitrators with
expertise in RICO matters.78 In addition, the Court concluded that
occasional overlap between RICO's civil and criminal provisions does not
preclude arbitration of civil claims.79
Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff's broad argument that public
interest in the enforcement of RICO precludes submission of claims to
arbitration. 0 In fact, the Court concluded that allowing arbitration of
RICO claims furthers the public interest because few civil suits are actually
brought and a private forum, such as arbitration, might encourage civil
71. 482 U.S. at 227.
72. Id. at 238, 242.
73. Id. at 238.
74. Id. at 227 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994).
76. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
77. Id. at 242.
78. Id. at 239.
79. Id. at 239-40.
80. Id. at 241-42.
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enforcement."1
In 1989, the Court further extended its presumption in favor of
arbitration in Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.82
In Rodriguez, the Court held that parties can waive a judicial forum for
claims involving the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Ace') and the
Exchange Act. 3 Similar to the Exchange Act provision at issue in
McMahon, section 14 of the Securities Act prohibits binding agreements
"to waive compliance with any provision" of the Securities Act. 4 The
Court applied the rationale it used in McMahon and similarly concluded
that the language of section 14 is insufficient to establish a congressional
intent to prohibit binding arbitration. 5
Although the Supreme Court ostensibly resolved any questions about the
validity of arbitration agreements, the picture is still incomplete. The
Mitsubishi line of cases adopted a strong presumption of arbitrability, but
because they did not involve statutory civil rights claims, they did not
explicitly overrule Alexander,86 which supported special treatment for such
statutory rights.87 In addition, the Supreme Court analyzed arbitration in
only two contexts: cases decided under collective bargaining agreements
and cases brought under boilerplate U-4 forms in the securities industry.
The Supreme Court had not ruled on a case that involved individual
contracts of employment between employers and employees.88
However, by 1989, both the Third and Fourth Circuits faced the issue of
whether individual employees may agree in their employment contracts to
binding arbitration. 9 The Third Circuit, in Nicholson v. CPC Internation-
al, Inc.,90 and the Fourth Circuit, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
81. 482 U.S. at 241-42.
82. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
83. Id. at 481. Rodriguez overruled Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (stating that "[tio the
extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded
in the substantive law... it has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal
statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes!).
84. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 479 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77n).
85. Id. at 482.
86. 490 U.S. 477.
87. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis in Alexander, see supra notes 27-40 and
accompanying text.
88. Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds database (Mar. 29, 1996).
89. Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989), reh'g and reh'g In bane denied,
No. 88-5588 (3d Cir. July 10, 1989), overruled by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20 (1991); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990), af'd, 500 U.S. 20
(1991).
90. 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989).
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Corp.,9 1 specifically discussed whether claims brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 92 must be arbitrated where
the arbitration agreement agreement is valid.93 Although the cases were
factually similar, the courts reached very different conclusions.
In Nicholson, the employee signed an "Executive Employment Agree-
ment" containing an arbitration clause.94 Approximately one year later,
Nicholson's employer eliminated his position.95 He filed a timely age
discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC")96 and sued his employer in state court for claims related to age
discrimination.97 After removing the case to federal court, the employer
moved for an order compelling arbitration of all claims, pursuant to the
arbitration clause in the employment agreement.98
The Third Circuit held that an employee cannot be compelled to arbitrate
an age discrimination claim.99 The court applied the McMahon test t" °
to determine whether Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial
forum or whether arbitration presents an inherent conflict with the ADEA's
underlying purposes.'t" Although the court failed to find language in the
ADEA that defines the effect of an arbitration agreement, the court
indicated that the "statutory scheme reflects Congress' careful structuring
91. 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990).
92. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994)).
93. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 222; Gilmer, 895 F.2d at 196.
94. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 222-23. The arbitration clause provided that:
[a]ny dispute or controversy arising under or in connection with this Agreement shall be
settled exclusively by arbitration, conducted before a panel of three arbitrators in New York
City in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association then in effect.
Judgment may be entered on the arbitrators' award in any court having jurisdiction. The
expense of such arbitration shall be borne by the Company.
Id. at 223. This clause is an example of a typical prospective arbitration agreement. Such an agreement
is one that the parties execute before a dispute actually arises.
95. Id. at 223.
96. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4, creates the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 empowers the EEOC to "prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful
employment practice" as set forth in Title VII.
97. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 223.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 230 (citing Criswell v. W. Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 547-49 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd on
other grounds, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1553 (10th
Cir. 1988); cf. Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc. 858 F.2d 1304, 1305-07 (8th Cir. 1988),
reh'g denied, 872 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989).
100. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
101. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224.
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of the procedure to be followed in enforcing the rights granted by the
Act." 2 In addition, the court found statements in the legislative history
suggesting that Congress intended to protect the ultimate resolution of
ADEA claims in a judicial forum. 3 However, the court determined that
the legislative history, like the statutory text, did not conclusively represent
congressional intent."°
The Nicholson court concluded that arbitration presents an inherent
conflict with the statutory scheme of the ADEA.'t 5 First, the court in
Nicholson believed that mandatory arbitration would discourage employees
from seeking EEOC involvemenL1 As the majority explained, filing a
charge with the EEOC is a prerequisite to court action under the
ADEA, °7 but employees will have little incentive to file discrimination
charges with the EEOC if they cannot subsequently proceed to a judicial
forum." 8 Thus, the court implied that eliminating discriminatory conduct
in the workplace would be more difficult if employees do not notify the
EEOC of such conduct."° The court explained that any process that
allows employers to avoid EEOC scrutiny "is necessarily incompatible with
the congressional scheme for the ADEA.""0
Second, the Third Circuit determined that arbitration is an inappropriate
forum for resolving ADEA claims."' The court argued that arbitral
102. Id. at 224. Because enforcement probeedings under the ADEA are governed by FLSA
enforcement proceedings, the court examined the Supreme Court's decision in Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981), and held that Barrentine requires that claims under
statutes designed to protect individual workers are not subject to binding arbitration. Id. at 225 (citing
450 U.S. at 737). However, because Barrentine involved a collective bargaining agreement, the court
held that the case is not dispositive of situations involving individual employment contracts. Id. at 225.
103. Id. at 226. The court considered Senator Kennedy's 1978 amendment to the ADEA, which
granted an explicit right to a jury trial. Id. at 226-27 n.5 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1988)). However,
because the Court found that a similar right to a jury trial also exists for claims brought under the
Sherman Act, which the Court determined arbitrable in Mitsubishi, the court refused to rely on this part
of the ADEA's legislative history. Id.
104. Id. at 226.
105. Id. at 227.
106. Id. The court explained that employees, by filing charges with EEOC, trigger investigation of
and collection of much of the information on employers. Id. Without employee-initiated charges, the
EEOC may only obtain information from investigations it initiates itself. Id. Thus, the EEOC would
never have reason to suspect particular employers of discriminatory practices unless an employee
notifies the EEOC of the employer's conduct. Id.
107. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1988)).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 227-28.
110. Id. at 227-28.
111. Id. at 228.
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boards lack the power to award broad, equitable relief granted to courts
under 29 U.S.C. § 626(b),"2 because an arbitrator's power does not
extend beyond the particular parties and their disputes.' 3
Finally, the court noted that individual employees may lack sufficient
bargaining power." 4 In particular, the court reasoned that older employ-
ees with limited job mobility may feel coerced into signing an arbitration
agreement presented by an employer."5 Similarly, employers may be able
to force new employees with limited bargaining power to sign an
arbitration agreement or remain unemployed.' 6 Based on its three key
concerns, the Third Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend
prospective arbitration agreements in individual employment contracts to
preclude access to a judicial forum."'
112. 877 F.2d at 228.
113. Id. Because arbitration is limited to the parties involved, arbitrators may be limited in their
ability to counter broad discriminatory conduct against all employees when deciding the individual
discrimination claims. Id. For a brief explanation of employment discrimination law and theories, see
Christine G. Cooper, Employment Discrimination Law and the Need for Reform, 16 VT. L. REV. 183
(1991).
Significantly, the court based its argument on arbitration processes in general rather than on the
expertise of modem arbitrators. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 229. The court suggested that the prior suspicion
of the competence of arbitrators expressed in Alexander and Barrentine is unfounded in light of the
Supreme Court's establishment of a strong presumption in favor of arbitration in Mitsubishi and
McMahon. Id. at 229 (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56-59; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743-45).
114. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 229.
115. Id.
116. Id. The court recognized that this type of duress may not render a contract voidable but
cautioned that "we cannot close our eyes to the realities of the workplace." Id. Some commentators
characterize arbitration agreements as "conditions of employment." See John A. Gray, Have the Foxes
Become the Guardians of the Chickens? The Post-Gilmer Legal Status of Predispute Mandatory
Arbitration as a Condition of Employment, 37 VILL. L. REv. 113, 119 (1992). Gray explains that:
(W)hile an agreement to arbitrate is ... a choice of forum and not a surrender or waiver of
substantive statutory rights or remedies, there is a 'take it or leave it' coercive aspect to the
agreement, even though theoretically the employer is also surrendering its right to take the
employee to court.
Id.
The defendants argued that Nicholson, an attorney and experienced executive, was well aware of
the nature of the arbitration agreement and thus, was not in an unequal bargaining position. Nicholson,
877 F.2d at 229. However, the court refused to adopt different rules based on the characteristics of
particular plaintiffs. Id.
117. Id. at 230. The majority concluded that a contrary decision would encourage arbitration
agreements, and thereby shift ADEA enforcement from the courts to arbitral forums. Id. The majority
explained that Congress should select the forums in which to enforce the ADEA. Id. at 231. See also
Howard, supra note 14, at 27 (explaining that it is "just a matter of time" before predispute agreements
will become the norm in most nonunion employment relationships). The court distinguished a
prospective waiver, which relinquishes an employee's rights with respect to potential future disputes,
from an individual's release of an ADEA claim once the discriminatory acts have "already transpired."
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Rejecting the Nicholson court's rationale, the Fourth Circuit, in Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,"8 held that Congress did not preclude
arbitration of ADEA claims under arbitration agreements between
employers and employees."t 9 Interstate, the defendant-employer, required
Gilmer, the plaintiff-employee, to register a U-4 form with the NYSE,'20
requiring arbitration of all employment disputes.' Upon discharge,
Gilmer brought suit in federal court alleging a violation of the ADEA."'
In response, Interstate filed a motion to compel arbitration under the
FAA." Relying on the Alexander line of cases, the district court denied
Interstate's Motion to Compel Arbitration. 4 The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed."'z
Applying the McMahon test, the Fourth Circuit found nothing in the
877 F.2d at 230. The latter release, according to the court, would be permissible. Id.
The Nicholson dissent argued that the FAA mandates enforcement of arbitration agreements in
individual employment contracts and that the ADEA does not evince a congressional intent to exclude
ADEA claims from arbitration. Id. at 244. First, the dissent noted that since Mitsubishi, courts have
dismissed concerns over the competence of arbitrators and the sufficiency of arbitration procedures. Id.
at 234. The dissent reasoned that ADEA disputes are no more complex than antitrust disputes, which
are subject to binding arbitration agreements, id., and are often simpler. Id. In addition, the dissent
argued that just because the usual civil trial procedures are not completely available, this does not mean
that arbitration restricts the substantive rights of the parties. Id. (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
The dissent also refuted the majority's argument that arbitration would limit the role of the EEOC.
Id. at 237. For support, the dissent cited a recent EEOC regulation proposing "that courts enforce
voluntary nonprospective waivers of all substantive ADEA rights without EEOC supervision, which
would effectively circumvent EEOC involvement." Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1627.166 (1988)).
Finally, the dissent dismissed the majority's argument regarding inequality of bargaining power. Id.
at 242-43. Noting some disparity in bargaining power in every contractual relationship, the dissent
explained that eliminating age discrimination is not defeated or undercut by upholding the arbitration
agreement. Id. at 243.
118. 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
119. Id. at 197. See also Pierce v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 90-C-0722, 1990 WL 60751
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 1990). The court in Pierce applied the McMahon test and reached the same
conclusion as the Gilmer Court. Id. at *2. After considering the Nicholson opinion, the Pierce Court
agreed with the Gilmer decision, because it gave "appropriate weight to the Supreme Court's
encouragement of arbitration." Id. at *3. The plaintiff in Pierce relied on the Alexander line of cases,
but the court distinguished the cases because the disputes involved collective bargaining agreements.
Id. The court concluded that individual agreements to arbitrate, unlike collective bargaining agreements,
do not deny substantive rights. Id.
120. 895 F.2d at 196 n.l. For a more detailed description of the U4 form, see supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
121. Id. at 196.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. The district court refused to uphold the arbitration agreement and send the ADEA claim
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"text, legislative history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA" that
indicated congressional intent "to preclude enforcement of arbitration
agreements." '26 According to the Fourth Circuit, courts should be
reluctant to imply statutory intent to preclude arbitration where Congress
has not expressed one, because it would undermine the strong presumption
in favor of arbitration. 27
The court analyzed Gilmer's arguments against arbitration and dismissed
each of them. 2 First, the majority analyzed the role of the EEOC and
concluded that enforcement of private arbitration agreements does not
render the agency ineffective.'29 Effectuating the purposes of the ADEA,
the majority explained, does not require EEOC involvement at all levels of
dispute resolution. 3 ° The FAA provides multiple forums, and individuals
are free to settle ADEA claims without EEOC involvement."' In addi-
tion, arbitration of the dispute does not preclude filing a charge with the
EEOC.3 2 The filing enables the EEOC to "investigate, conciliate, or
enforce [the charge] through litigation."'3 The court also discussed the
ADEA enforcement model, which is based on FLSA, and concluded that
Congress' choice of courts as the initial forum for EEOC enforced dispute
resolution did not constitute congressional intent to preclude private
arbitration agreements.'34
Secondly, the court rejected Gilmer's concern with the arbitrator's power
to award damages. 35 The majority noted that arbitrators possess broad
equitable powers to grant any remedy "necessary to right the wrongs within
their jurisdiction." 36 For example, the majority recognized that arbitrators
may order reinstatement or promotion of employees. 7 The court ex-
plained that even if arbitrators do not have the full equitable power and
126. 895 F.2d at 197.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 197-203.
129. Id. at 197-98.
130. Id. at 198. The Court explained that the EEOC's effectiveness "is not now, nor has it ever
been, dependent on its participation in the resolution of all claims under the ADEA." Id. at 197.
131. Id. at 198.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 199. Although the ADEA provides that suits should be brought in a judicial forum, the
Court concluded that the statute does not preclude parties from reaching a private agreement to arbitrate
their disputes. Id.
135. Id. at 199-200.
136. Id. at 199.
137. Id.
459
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discretion accorded to courts, this alone "does not deny the utility of this
alternative means of resolving disputes."'3 The court concluded that
Congress enacted the ADEA cognizant of the extent of arbitral power and
chose not to prohibit arbitration of ADEA claims.'39
Third, the majority rejected Gilmer's contention that the ADEA's
provision for a jury trial indicates congressional intent to preclude
waiver."' The court reasoned that the jury trial provision "does not
mandate that every ADEA trial be a trial by jury."'' For support, the
court noted that the ADEA clearly allows claimants to waive a trial by
jury.14
2
The court also supported its holding by emphasizing that federal courts
serve as only one of the forums for resolution of ADEA claims. 4 3 The
court explained that Congress' grant of concurrent jurisdiction to federal
and state courts provides evidence of its intent to allow waiver of the
judicial forum." According to the majority, this broad right of forum
selection includes the right to select arbitration.t41
Finally, the majority dismissed Gilmer's assertion that arbitration
procedures are inadequate for ADEA claims. 146 The majority held that
ADEA claims are proper for arbitration because they involve "simple,
factual inquiries" that are no more complex than claims under the Sherman
Act or RICO, which the court has previously held suitable for arbitra-
tion. 14 Finally, possible judicial review of an arbitrator's decision ensures
compliance with the statute. 41
III. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: THE SUPREME COURT IN GILMER
UPHOLDS ARBITRATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE'S AGE
DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
In 1991, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
among the circuits regarding the enforcement of individual agreements to
138. 895 F.2d at 199.
139. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding that in passing a statute,




143. Id. at 200.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 201.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2344).
148. Id. at 202 (citing McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2340).
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arbitrate employment discrimination claims. 4 9 In Gilmer,'5" the Court
held that the FAA mandates enforcement of such agreements when found
in a U-4 form.' Further, the Court concluded that final arbitration of
employment discrimination claims bars judicial action by the employee.'52
The Court found no inconsistencies between agreements to arbitrate age
discrimination claims and the social policy of prohibiting discrimination in
the workplace.'53 The Court explained that even though arbitration is
limited to the specific disputes of the parties involved, this neither prevents
the arbitral forum from furthering broad social purposes nor inhibits the
development of the law. 54 To support its holding, the Court noted that
the "Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and the
Securities Act of 1933 [are all] designed to advance important public
policies but ... claims under those statutes are appropriate for arbitra-
tion."'155
The Court rejected Gilmer's challenges to arbitration procedures.' 56
First, the Court noted it's earlier rejection of the argument that arbitrators
are incompetent 157 and dismissed Gilmer's assertion that arbitration panels
will be biased. The Court further justified it's preference for arbitration
procedures by indicating that the NYSE rules applicable to Gilmer provided
149. 498 U.S. 809 (1990).
150. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
151. Id. at 35. It is important to note that the arbitration agreement in Gilmer appeared in a U-4
form rather than an employment contract like the agreement in Nicholson. See id. at 23; see supra note
7 and accompanying text; see also Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 222. Lower courts,
however, are using the Gilmer decision to extend the validity of arbitration agreements to all types of
employment contracts, even though Gilmer did not technically condone such use. See Maye v. Smith
Barney, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 570, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Gateson v. ASLK-Rank, N.VJCGER-Banque
S.A., No. 94-C-5849, 1995 WL 387720, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1995); Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc.,
25 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 638 (1994); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton
Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992); Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1242
(D.N.J. 1994); Hull V. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303, 306 (E.D. Mo. 1993); DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar.
Bank of New York, 807 F. Supp. 947, 952 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
152. Id. at 26.
153. Id. at 27.
154. Id. at 27-28.
155. Id. at 28. The Court rejected Gilmer's argument that arbitration would undermine the role of
the EEOC. Id. at 29. The Court noted, as an example, that even though the Securities and Exchange
Commission is very involved in the enforcement of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
Securities Act of 1933, the Court has held claims under both statutes subject to binding arbitration. Id.
at 29 (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220; Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 477 (1989)).
156. Id. at 30-32.
157. Id. at 30 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 634).
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specific protections, such as peremptory challenges, against biased
panels.'58 Second, the Court dismissed Gilmer's concern that limited
discovery provisions in arbitration would render it difficult to prove
discrimination.'59 The Court explained that ADEA claims do not require
more extensive discovery than claims brought under other statutes, such as
RICO, which the Court has already held subject to arbitration. 60 Al-
though arbitration procedures may not be as extensive as procedural rules
in federal court, the Court argued that a party, by agreeing to arbitrate,
"trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration..'' The Court also
reasoned that parties in arbitration will benefit because arbitrators are not
bound by the rules of evidence and thus are able to more easily admit
otherwise objectionable evidence.' 62
Next, the Court rejected Gilmer's argument that sending ADEA claims
to binding arbitration will result in a lack of public knowledge of
employers' discriminatory practices and will inhibit the development of the
law.' 63 The Court reasoned that merely because some ADEA claims will be
subject to arbitration does not mean that courts will cease to address those
claims.'" In addition, NYSE rules require that arbitration awards be in
158. 500 U.S. at 30. For example, the rules require that parties "be informed of the employment
histories of the arbitrators and that they be allowed to make further inquiries into arbitrators'
backgrounds." Id. (citing 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2608, at 4315 (Rule 608) (1991) [hereinafter
NYSE GUIDE)). Furthermore, the court noted that "each party is allowed one peremptory challenge and
unlimited challenges for cause.' Id. (citing NYSE GUIDE 2609, at 4315 (Rule 609)). Arbitrators are
also required to disclose "any circumstances which might preclude [them] from rendering an objective
and impartial determination." Id. (citing NYSE GUIDE 2610, at 4315 (Rule 610)). The FAA also
provides that courts may overturn arbitral decisions "[w]here there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrators." Id. at 30-31 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1988)).
159. 500 U.S. at 31.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 31 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 31-32. Gilmer argued that if parties arbitrate employment discrimination claims, courts
will be unable to develop consistent sources of case law to further social policies behind the
antidiscrimination statutes. Id. at 31. For further discussion of this theory, see Michael Lieberman,
Overcoming the Presumption of Arbitrability of ADEA Claims: The Triumph of Substantive over
Procedural Values in Nicholson v. CPC, Int'l, Inc., 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1817, 1822 (1990)
("[d]isplacing the judicial forum in favor of arbitration for discrimination claims may discourage
grievants from seeking relief, thus undermining the purpose of the antidiscrimination statutes"); Owen
M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE J. 1073, 1085-86 (1984) (opining that "when the
parties settle, society gets less than what appears. ... Parties might settle while leaving justice
undone"). For this reason, some commentators conclude that commercial arbitration, which is essentially
transactional in focus, cannot lead to broad institutional reforms. See generally G. Shell, supra note 59.
164. 500 U.S. at 32.
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writing, contain the names of the parties, summarize the issues in
controversy, describe the award issued, and be made available to the
public.16
5
Finally, the Court dismissed Gilmer's concerns about the ability of
arbitrators to award broad equitable relief.'6 Instead, the Court deter-
mined that arbitrators have broad powers to grant equitable relief.67
Supporting its position, the Court noted that nothing precludes the EEOC
from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief.168
After rejecting Gilmer's procedural concerns, the Court similarly
disregarded Gilmer's claim that his employer possessed superior bargaining
power. 169 According to the Court, mere inequality of bargaining power
fails to establish that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the
employment context. 70 As an example, the Court noted that relationships
between securities investors and dealers often involve unequal bargaining
power, but agreements to arbitrate in those contexts are enforceable.1
The Court also explained that § 2 of the FAA requires enforcement of
arbitration agreements except when "such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."' 72 In Gilmer, the Court
concluded that there were no such grounds because there was no indication
that Gilmer was coerced or defrauded into signing the arbitration clause in
his U-4 form.173
Although the Court upheld the arbitration agreement in Gilmer, it
declined to overrule the Alexander line of cases, which refused to allow
binding arbitration of discrimination claims. However, the Court
distinguished the cases on several grounds.77 First, the Alexander line of
cases did not involve the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims. 76 Rather, they discussed whether "arbitration of contract-based
165. Id. at 31-32 (citing NYSE GUIDE, supra note 158,1 2627(a),(e), at 4321 (Rule 627); 1 2627(f),
at 4322 (Rule 627)).
166. Id. at 32.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 32-33.
170. Id. at 33.
171. Id. (citing Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 484; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 230).
172. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 35.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims." 77 In
Alexander, the employees had never agreed to arbitrate their statutory
claims. Moreover, the Court indicated that the labor arbitrators in Alexander
were not authorized to arbitrate such claims because the arbitration
agreement only covered contract-based claims.
78
Second, the arbitration in the Alexander line of cases was governed by
a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union rather than by an
individual employment contract negotiated by the individual employee.
79
Under the agreement, the unions represented the employees in the
arbitration proceedings. 80 Thus, bargaining unit interests prevailed over
individual interests. Finally, the cases were not decided under the FAA, so
the parties were not bound by the strong presumption of arbitrability. 8 '
Because these cases are so factually distinguishable from Gilmer and thus
inapplicable to the Gilmer decision, the Court did not expressly overrule
their holdings.
The Supreme Court left two critical issues unresolved in Gilmer. First,
because the arbitration agreement in Gilmer fell within a securities
registration agreement rather than within the employment contract itself, the
Court did not rule on whether § 1 of the FAA prohibits enforcement of
arbitration agreements in individual employment contracts." 2 Second,
because the Court did not expressly overrule Alexander, it is unclear
whether statutory civil rights claims are subject to binding arbitration based
on arbitration agreements in individual employment contracts rather than
in securities registration forms.
IV. EXTENDING GILMER: ENFORCING ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN
INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, Congress, the courts and
the Executive Branch seem willing to enforce arbitration agreements in
employment contracts and to compel arbitration of statutory discrimination
claims. In addition, the EEOC initiated pilot alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") programs in Houston, Philadelphia, New Orleans, and Washing-
177. 500 U.S. at 35.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. Lower courts subsequently explained that Gilmer does not apply to collective bargaining
agreements. See Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 858 F. Supp. 802, 804 (C.D. Ill. 1994).
181. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
182. See supra note 12.
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ton, D.C."3 The voluntary programs use outside mediators 84 rather
than EEOC employees to handle disputes." 5 These developments indicate
widespread support for out-of-court, alternative dispute procedures such as
arbitration.
A. Executive and Legislative Developments
The policy decisions of the executive administration, under President
George Bush, evidenced support for arbitration. President Bush vetoed the
Civil Rights Act of 1990, which encouraged arbitration of Title VII claims
but stated that plaintiffs should not be bound by an arbitrator's deci-
sion. 86 However, President Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991
("the 1991 Act"),"7 which encouraged the use of alternative dispute
resolution but removed the provision stating that plaintiffs should not be
bound by the arbitral decision. 88 Section 118 of the 1991 Act explicitly
183. EEOC's Pilot Mediation Program Off to Slow Start, Official Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA),
May 4, 1993, at A14 to A15 [hereinafter EEOC Program].
184. Mediation is similar to arbitration in that a neutral third person, the mediator, helps disputing
parties reach an agreement in a private, informal dispute resolution process. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
981 (6th ed. 1990). However, a mediator, unlike an arbitrator, "has no power to impose a decision on
the parties." Id.
185. See EEOC Program, supra note 183, at A14 to A15. The program only covers Title VII,
ADEA, and Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") on the "issues of discharge, discipline, and terms
and conditions of employment." Id. Reasonable accommodation, class action, and equal pay claims are
ineligible for mediation under the pilot program. Id. at A15.
The EEOC reserves jurisdiction and the right to take over proceedings if the parties are unable to
reach an agreement through mediation. Letter and Memo from EEOC Legal Counsel Thomisina V.
Rogers, DAILY LAB. REp. (BNA), Apr. 5, 1993, at F1 to F2.
186. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of Conference, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 856, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1990). In August of 1994, Reps. Pat Schroeder, Edward Markey, and Marjorie
Margolies-Mezvinsky introduced H.R. 4981, which was similar to a bill introduced earlier that year in
the Senate, S. 2012, by Sen. Russell Feingold. 140 CONG. REc. E1753 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1994)
(remarks of Rep. Schroeder on H.R. 4981); 140 CONG. REc. S4266-67 (remarks of Sen. Feingold on
S2012). The bill would have prevented employers from forcing workers to resolve employment
discrimination claims through arbitration. Bill Would Allow Workers to Sue Over Harassment, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1994, at D2 [hereinafter Harassment Bill]. The legislation would have amended seven
federal laws, including the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id. While workers could voluntarily choose
arbitration, they would still have the option to sue in court. Id. Rep. Schroeder explained: "In essence,
what we're doing is reversing the Gilmer decision and saying you cannot make employees give up their
federal rights at the time they are hired." Id. Asserting that arbitration can be biased, Rep. Markey said:
"The counsel for O.3. Simpson would be hard-pressed to find fair representation (on the arbitration
boards)" Democrats Target Brokerages' Labor Practices, DENVER POST, Aug. 18, 1994, at C2.
187. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
188. See id. Alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") is a term used to describe "procedures for
settling disputes by means other than litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 78 (6th ed. 1990). In
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states that "the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including...
arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts."'
89
Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 excluded the provision for a judicial
forum when parties agree to binding arbitration, it seems clear that
Congress intended to recognize binding arbitration agreements in individual
employment contracts.
Also in 1991, President Bush promulgated Executive Order 12778,190
which encouraged the use of voluntary dispute resolutions by federal
agencies t191 President Bush specifically encouraged informal methods of
dispute resolution such as "informal discussions, negotiations, and
settlements," rather than formal court proceedings. 92 The President hoped
the order would provide a model for similar reforms in the private sector
and at the state level. 93 The Bush Administration's support for ADR
influenced the lower courts.
B. Judicial Developments
Lower courts have applied the Supreme Court's analysis in Gilmer to
uphold arbitration agreements in individual employment contracts, even
those that compel arbitration of statutory discrimination claims.'94
addition to arbitration, ADR encompasses such processes as mediation and mini-trials. Id. ADR, which
is usually less costly and more expedient, is now used in a variety of contexts, including divorce
actions, motor vehicle and medical malpractice tort claims, and other disputes that would otherwise
involve court litigation. Id.
189. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991). Section 118 clearly applies to individual
employment contracts. See Gray, supra note 116, at 131 n.64. For further evidence of Congress' intent
to allow alternative dispute methods such as arbitration, see 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (1994) (authorizing
federal courts "to refer appropriate cases to alternative dispute programs").
190. Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991).
191. Id. at 55,195-96.
192. Id. at 55,196.
193. Id. at 55,195.
194. See, e.g., Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that it
is "well-settled" that federal statutory claims, including discrimination claims, are subject to binding
arbitration). In December 1994, the Supreme Court seemed to endorse the post-Gilmer trend by denying
certiorari to Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., a case in which the Ninth Circuit enforced an arbitrator's
resolution of an employee's discrimination claims and denied ajudicial forum. 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 638 (1994).
Arguably, Nghiem was an easy case. The employee initiated arbitration proceedings pursuant to the
company "Problem Resolution Process," presented evidence and argument in arbitration hearings, and
submitted a fifty page closing brief before filing suit in state court. Id. at 1439. The court interpreted
Nghiem's voluntary actions as a waiver of any objections he might have had over the authority of the
arbitrator. Id. at 1440. The Ninth Circuit cited Fortune, Alsweet & Eldridge, Inc. v. Daniel, 724 F.2d
1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1983), a factually similar case in which the same circuit confirmed an arbitration
466
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Plaintiffs argue that the courts have extended the Gilmer rationale too far
and present two key arguments against binding arbitration of discrimination
claims: First, Congress intended to preclude arbitration of Title VII
claims; 195 and second, plaintiffs must knowingly waive statutory rights in
order to be bound by arbitration. 96
1. Congressional Intent to Preclude Arbitration of Title VII Claims
The Ninth Circuit, in Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,19' did
not agree that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of Title VII claims.
Instead, the court, applying Gilmer, held that Title VII claims were subject
to binding arbitration. In Mago,9 5 a female employee, Mago, brought a
Title VII action against her employer, Shearson, alleging sexual harassment
and gender discrimination."9 Shearson moved "to stay the proceedings
and compel arbitration under the terms of its employment agreement" with
Mago.200
Mago, like the plaintiff in Gilmer, relied on the Alexander line of cases
and argued that Congress intended to prohibit binding arbitration of Title
VII disputes because arbitration presents an "inherent conflict"' with the
underlying purposes of Title VII.202 The Ninth Circuit found the Supreme
Court's decision in Gilmer dispositive. Because Title VII and the ADEA
award, noting that it had "long recognized a rule that a party may not submit a claim to arbitration then
challenge the authority of the arbitrator to act after receiving an unfavorable result." Id. See also
Teamsters Local Union No. 764 v. J.H. Merritt & Co., 770 F.2d 40, 42 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Daniel
and upholding an arbitration award). If a case more difficult than these were to arise, the Supreme Court
might decide to review the Gilmer extension.
195. See infra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 206-24 and accompanying text. In addition to these two arguments, plaintiffs
sometimes make the futile argument that § I of the FAA does not govern arbitration agreements in
individual employment contracts, but courts have uniformly rejected the argument. See, e.g., Crawford
v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1240-41 (D.N.J. 1994); Hull v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp.
303, 306 (E.D. Mo. 1993). For further discussion of the debate over § 1 of the FAA, see supra note
12.
197. 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 934. Mago brought her claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982), which prohibits
employers from discriminating against pregnant female employees. Id.
200. Id. at 934. The arbitration clause required Mago to arbitrate "any controversy concerning
compensation, employment, or termination of employment with Shearson." Id.
201. "Inherent conflict" refers to the McMahon test. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987). For a discussion of the McMahon test, see supra notes 66-70 and
accompanying text.
202. 956 F.2d at 935.
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contain similar goals and substantive provisions, 3 Mago's claims under
Title VII were subject to binding arbitration just like Gilmer's claims under
the ADEA.2 4 Thus, after Gilmer, courts have refused to interpret con-
gressional intent to preclude binding arbitration of individual employment
discrimination claims. 0 5
2. Plaintiffs Must Knowingly Waive Statutory Rights to Be Bound by
Arbitration
Even if courts generally uphold binding arbitration agreements, plaintiffs
argue that arbitration clauses are unenforceable unless the employee
knowingly waives his statutory rights.0 6 Although courts have interpreted
Gilmer as allowing employees to waive the right to a judicial forum by
signing an arbitration agreement in an employment contract, the Ninth
Circuit adopted the plaintiffs' argument and recognized a narrow exception
to Gilmer."' In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai,"' the Ninth Circuit
refused to uphold an arbitration agreement because the employer never
gave the plaintiffs an opportunity to read the agreement before signing a U-
4 form.2"9 The court concluded that employees may agree to arbitrate
statutory employment claims, but it narrowed the issue to whether the
plaintiffs had executed valid and knowing waivers" of Title VII reme-
• 203. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (explaining that Title VII and the ADEA are
very similar statutes and are designed to accomplish the same goals); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert
Co., 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding the ADEA and Title VII statutorily similar, and thus,
concluding that neither the ADEA nor Title VII arbitral awards preclude access to a judicial forum).
204. 956 F.2d at 935. See also Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding that, in light of Gilmer's reasoning, it is clear that Title VII claims are subject
to compulsory arbitration). But see Gary v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 886 F. Supp. 78,
85-87 (1995) (concluding that Title VII claims cannot be subject to binding arbitration unless the claim
involves a labor dispute subject to mandatory arbitration under terms of a collective bargaining
agreement).
205. E.g., 956 F.2d at 935.
206. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994).
207. See id.
208. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
209. Id. at 1305.
210. The court did not define a "valid and knowing waiver." It simply based its decision on the fact
that the arbitration agreement did not define the types of disputes subject to arbitration. Id. Because the
agreement did not specifically refer to Title VII disputes, the court concluded that the employees did
not knowingly forego their rights to a judicial forum. Id.
Unlike the court in Lai, the Third Circuit, in Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514,
522 (3d Cir. 1988), defined "voluntarily and knowingly" for purposes of allowing settlement of ADEA
claims through private waivers of ADEA rights. The Third Circuit explained:
whether a waiver has been "knowingly and willfully" made has been predicated upon an
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dies.21'
In Lai, the employer directed employees to sign U-4 forms without
allowing them to read the forms.' Without mentioning arbitration or
giving the plaintiffs a copy of the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") Manual, which contained the actual terms of the
arbitration agreement, the employer told the employees that the forms
were necessary to apply for a test required for employment.1 4 The court
held that the employees did not knowingly waive their statutory remedies
in favor of arbitration because even had they read the forms, neither the U-
4 form nor the NASD Manual described the types of disputes subject to
evaluation of several indicia arising from the circumstances and conditions under which the
release was executed. Among those factors... are general principles of contract construction
such as the clarity.., of the language... and the absence of fraud or undue influence.
Id. at 522 (citations omitted). See also Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539, 541 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987) (finding that an ADEA substantive waiver is valid so long as
there is no "exploitation or overreaching"); Moore v. McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026, 1033 (8th
Cir. 1986) (holding that an ADEA substantive waiver is valid "in the absence of fraud, deceit, or
unconscionable overreaching"). In Coventry, the Third Circuit justified its heightened standard for
evaluating waivers by explaining that the policy of eliminating employment discrimination required the
court to evaluate the totality of the circumstances in addition to contract principles. 856 F.2d at 522-23.
Evaluating the Coventry decision, the Nicholson dissent rejected the Third Circuit's heightened
standard. The dissent based its argument on the conclusion that arbitration satisfies the policy concern
of eliminating discrimination. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 242 n.14. Thus, the Nicholson dissent relied solely
upon general contract principles to evaluate the employee's waiver of judicial forum. See id. at 242.
211. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1303. In Lai, the Ninth Circuit relied on a House Report that discussed the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Report stated: "[T]he use of alternative dispute mechanisms is intended
to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus, for example.., any agreement
to submit disputed issues to arbitration ... in an employment contract, does not preclude the affected
person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII." H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102nd
Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635. The court also noted a statement made by
Senator Dole during debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305. Dole explained that
the Civil Rights Act encourages arbitration only "where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to
use these methods." 137 CONG. REc. S.15472-15478 (daily ed. October 30, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Dole).
At least one court, when discussing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lai, criticized Lai's reliance on
this portion of the legislative history because it expressly contradicts the plain language of the text of
the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 100, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
212. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1301.
213. Id. The arbitration agreement in the NASD Manual, which was not given to the plaintiffs
before they signed the documents, provides: "Any dispute, claim or controversy eligible for submission
under part I of this Code between or among members and/or associated persons ... arising in
connection with the business of such member(s) or in connection with the activities of such associated
person(s), shall be arbitrated under this Code...." Id. at 1302. The plaintiffs also argued that even had
they knowingly agreed to the arbitration clause, they could not be subject to binding arbitration because
the language of the arbitration provision "does not cover employment disputes." Id. at 1303.
214. Id. at 1301.
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arbitration.215
Courts have narrowly construed the Lai exception. In Gateson v. ASLK-
Bank, N. V/CGER-Banque S.A., 216 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York bound the plaintiff to an arbitration clause despite her
argument that she had not executed a knowing waiver.217 Unlike the
plaintiffs in Lai, Gateson had read the arbitration agreement but argued that
the language of the clause was too vague to put her on notice that it
covered discrimination claims.218 The court compared the plaintiffs
arbitration clause, which mandated arbitration of controversies "arising out
of or related to" the employment agreement, to the clause in Lai, which
required arbitration of disputes "arising in connection with the busi-
ness." '219 Even though the plaintiff's clause did not specifically mention
employment discrimination claims, the court concluded that the clause was
broad enough to encompass her discrimination claims.2 0
Just two months after its decision in Gateson, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York further criticized the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Lai. In Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc.,221 the court applied
ordinary contract principles and explained that, in the absence of fraud or
wrongdoing on the part of the employer, an employee signing an employ-
ment contract is presumed to know and assent to its contents.222 Because
the plaintiffs had signed employment documents containing arbitration
clauses, the court found that they knowingly agreed to submit employment
disputes to arbitration.22 Because courts have narrowly construed the Lai
decision, an employer can presumably ensure than employees execute
"knowing waivers" simply by clarifying the language of the arbitration
215. 42 F.3d at 1305.
216. No. 94 Civ. 5849, 1995 WL 387720 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1995).
217. Id. at *3, *5.
218. Id. at *3.
219. Id. at *4.
220. Id. at *3. For similar conclusions with respect to clauses requiring arbitration of disputes
"arising out of or relating to" the employment contract, see Cherry v. Wertheim Schroder & Co., 868
F. Supp. 830 (D.S.C. 1994) (explaining that the arbitration clause put plaintiff on notice that her Title
VII claims were subject to binding arbitration); Hull v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Mo. 1993)
(requiring plaintiff to submit to binding arbitration of Title VII and age discrimination claims because
the arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass such claims).
221. 897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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clause in its employment contracts. 4
V. IN SUPPORT OF GILMER: A PROPOSAL FOR ARBITRATION OF
STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Arbitration constitutes a viable alternative to the judicial system for
resolving disputes between employers and their employees. If arbitration
mirrored litigation, parties would have no incentive to choose an alternative
means of dispute resolution. Even though Gilmer expressly controls only
the context of arbitration agreements in U-4 forms, its analysis is equally
persuasive in individual employment contracts. An arbitration agreement in
an employment contract should be just as effective as an arbitration
agreement in a U-4 form. In fact, employers have an even stronger
argument that courts should uphold arbitration agreements in employment
contracts: Unlike the U-4 form, which only governs the employee's
relationship with third parties, such as the NYSE, the employment contract
directly governs the employer-employee relationship.
However, recognizing that arbitration procedures differ from judicial
procedures, this Note addresses four areas of concern: employment contract
arbitration, arbitration procedures, arbitrators' powers to award damages,
and standards for judicial review. To encourage the use of alternative
dispute resolution and to further protect the rights of the parties, this Note
proposes a framework for arbitration of employment discrimination claims
that satisfies the competing concerns of efficiency and fairness.
A. Providing for Arbitration in the Employment Contract
Although Gilmer holds that an arbitration agreement is not a contract of
adhesion,225 courts continue to scrutinize the process by which employees
agree to binding arbitration. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Lai indicates
that a court may only force a Title VII plaintiff to forgo her statutory
remedies and arbitrate her claims if she knowingly agrees to submit such
disputes to arbitration. 6
Although, in Lai, the Ninth Circuit did not specifically outline the
elements of a "knowing waiver,"2" the court's opinion did identify
224. For a sample arbitration clause that would eliminate confusion over the scope of the arbitration
agreement, see infra notes 231-32 and accompanying text
225. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
226. PrudentialInsurance v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994). For a discussion of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Lai, see supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
227. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305. See also supra note 210.
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deficiencies in both the language of the contract and the signing proce-
dures. 8 First, the arbitration clause was vague:22 It simply required
arbitration of disputes "arising in connection with the business. ' 230
Understandably, an employee reading this provision might not realize that
the employer intended the clause to encompass age discrimination claims
as well as contract disputes. A better clause, which should occupy a bold
and conspicuous place in the contract, would add this language:
This agreement to submit to arbitration includes, by way of example, any
employment disputes involving unlawful discrimination, harassment, or
wrongful discharge." t Employment disputes include, but are not limited to,
all claims, demands, or actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Civil Rights Act of 1866, Civil Rights Act of 1991 ... and all
amendments to the aforementioned statutes, any other federal, state, or local
statute or regulation regarding employment discrimination, or the termination
of employment, and the common law of any state. 1 2
This type of clause should eliminate ambiguities as to the scope of the
arbitration clause. Furthermore, when employees sign the contract, the
clause will inform them that discrimination claims are subject to binding
arbitration.
In Lai, the court also criticized the employee's deficient signing proce-
dures. 3 The employer never provided the employees with a copy of the
agreement to read and also falsely identified the employment forms as
registration forms for mandatory exams. Thus, the employees were
completely unaware of the rights they were waiving.234
To ensure that employees understand arbitration agreements, some
commentators have suggested that employers separate arbitration agree-
ments from employment contracts.235 After an employee is hired and
228. See Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
229. See id. at 1302.
230. Id.
231. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DIsPuTEs: A MANUAL ON
DRAFrING PROCEDURES 6 (May 1993).
232. Maye v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (reviewing the language
of the employment contract, which included the stated provision). For further explanation of why the
employer should specifically mention the statutory rights included in the agreement to arbitrate, see
Note, supra note 23, at 586.
233. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1301.
234. Id.
235. See Joseph E. Herman, Arbitrate, Don't Litigate, at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1991, at CI.
Under this proposal, Herman explains:
[Employees] could not be dismissed or disadvantaged for not choosing an alternative to
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signs an employment contract, the parties can discuss an arbitration
agreement and the employee can make an independent decision whether to
sign the arbitration agreement." This approach would presumably reduce
pressure to sign arbitration agreements, because agreeing to arbitrate would
no longer be a condition of employment. 7
However, an employer-employee relationship always involves some
degree of unequal bargaining power. Simply because an employer presents
an employee with an arbitration agreement on her second day of work
rather than the first day does not mean that she is in a dramatically
different position. It is unlikely that most employees would refuse to sign
the agreement immediately after accepting their jobs. If the employer used
an arbitration clause similar to the suggested provision, it should be
sufficient that the employer encourages the employee to read the terms of
the contract and provides the employee with ample opportunity to read the
document before asking her to sign it. Such a procedure would presumably
meet the standard set forth in Lai.
B. Arbitration Procedures
Although an arbitration proceeding is a quasi-judicial procedure,
arbitrators are generally not bound by the rules of practice in the
courts. 8 Unless the arbitration agreement specifies the procedures to be
followed, the arbitrator is granted broad discretion in determining the
procedures so long as the proceedings are conducted honestly and
fairly. 9 Arbitrators should be allowed more flexibility because if
arbitration procedures mirror civil litigation, arbitral forums would in effect
constitute a parallel court system and parties would have no incentive to
litigation. Once made, the choice would be binding for the duration of the person's
employment, unless both parties agreed to a change. Neither employers nor employees would
be forced to agree to arbitration, but both would be able to establish a binding alternative.
Id.
236. See id.
237. See Coral Kingdom v. Harter, 649 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Haw. 1982).
238. See Drinane v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 606 N.E.2d 1181, 1183 (Ill. 1992). Arbitration
represents a trade-off between elaborate fact-finding, and cost and time savings and informality. See
Thomas H. Stewart, Arbitrating Claims Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 59
CIN. L. REv. 1415, 1436-37 (1991). Stewart argues that parties who agree in advance to arbitrate claims
cannot claim the defense that arbitration procedures are inadequate to resolve their claims. Id.
239. See, e.g., U.S. Turney Exploration, Inc. v. PSI, Inc., 577 So. 2d 1131, 1135 (La. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that absent an agreement between the parties, arbitrators are not bound by formal rules
of procedure and evidence and need only ensure that the parties are granted a "fundamentally fair
hearing").
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choose an alternative means of dispute resolution.
Arbitration offers advantages to each party involved. Parties settle
disputes in a less antagonistic and more private forum,240 which generally
saves each party time241 and money.2 42 Efficiency allows both employer
and employee to return to work much sooner. In addition, the lower cost
of arbitration should actually increase access to the legal system for parties
with limited financial resources.243
However, recognizing that employment disputes raise different issues
than commercial disputes, the American Arbitration Association
("AAA")244  promulgated the Employment Dispute Resolution Rules
("EDR Rules").245 Because the AAA specifically tailored these rules to
govern enployment disputes, employers should explicitly state in
arbitration agreements that the EDR Rules shall apply to all disputes.
Furthermore, a presumption of binding arbitration should attach to parties
240. Arbitration proceedings, unlike judicial proceedings, are not a matter of public record. See
generally, SUSAN M. LEESON & BRYAN M. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT: DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA
47 (1988). Both parties benefit from the relative privacy of arbitration proceedings. Arbitration will not
limit employees' opportunities to find other employment because the public will not have access to the
employee's dispute with her employer. Similarly, employers will not suffer from a negative public
perception of their hiring and employment practices.
241. One study indicates that litigated cases generally take 3 to 8 years to reach final resolution
while arbitration generally resolves disputes in less than 10 months. Garry G. Mathiason & Pavneet S.
Uppal, Evaluating and Using Employer-Initiated Arbitration Policies and Agreements: Preparing the
Workplaceforthe Twenty-First Century, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS
IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 875, 894 (ALI-ABI Course of Study Materials No. C902, 1994).
ADEA plaintiffs, in particular, benefit from the time savings in arbitration. See Note, supra note 23,
at 582. Because older employees may encounter more difficulty in obtaining other employment, they
may have no source of income with which to fund a protracted lawsuit. Id.
242. See Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 241, at 894 (noting that arbitration of employment
disputes may reduce costs as much as 50%). The lower cost of arbitration may even increase access to
the legal system for plaintiffs with limited financial resources. See Note, supra note 23, at 581.
243. See Note, supra note 23, at 581. The Note's author argues that plaintiffs' attorneys may be
reluctant to accept judicial cases of discrimination claims on a contingency basis because of the cost
and uncertainty involved. Id. (citing Sharon Walsh, The Vanishing Job-Bias Lawyers; Attorneys, Law
Firms Say They Can't Afford to Try Cases, WASH. POST, July 6, 1990, at Cl). Thus, arbitration benefits
plaintiff-employees as well as their employers.
244. The AAA "is a public service, not-for-profit organization offering a broad range of dispute
resolution services through offices located in major cities across the United States." See EDR RULES,
supra note 18, at 3. Furthermore, through its main office in New York, the "AAA provides consulting
services, education and training, specialized publications, and research on all forms of dispute
settlement." Id.
245. Id. The AAA developed the EDR Rules as a guide for employers to follow when employers
and employees agree to arbitrate their employment-related disputes. Id. Although the rules are not
mandatory, this Note suggests that employers should state in their arbitration agreements that the EDR
Rules apply in all disputes.
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whose disputes adhere to the EDR Rules. The AAA should also adopt
several additional rules governing the parties' selection of an arbitrator,
evidence and discovery before and during arbitration, and arbitration
opinions.
1. Choice of Arbitrator
Under the EDR Rules, arbitrators must be neutral246 and familiar with
the employment field.247 When a party submits a dispute to the AAA, it
sends each party a list of potential arbitrators. 8 Similar to the NYSE
rules applicable in Gilmer,249 the AAA rules should require arbitrators to
disclose their employment histories and any circumstances that would
preclude them from rendering impartial opinions? ° The AAA should
send this information to the parties when it provides a potential list of
arbitrators. Furthermore, when the AAA sends a list to disputing parties, it
should allow each party to strike three names from the list and number the
246. Id. at 14, 15 (rules 8(b) and 8(c)). A court may set aside any award rendered by an arbitrator
if he fails to make adequate disclosure of facts relevant to assessing his impartiality. Andros Compania
Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 579 F.2d 691, 699 (2d Cir. 1978).
Plaintiffs argue that hearings can be biased when one party is a "repeat player" who brings numerous
cases before the same arbitrators each year. Richard C. Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, CAL. LAW.,
Feb. 1994, at 53. In 1994, the United States General Accounting Office completed a study on arbitration
panels. Beth Healy, Ex-Broker Wins Gender-Bias Case, BOSTON Bus. J., Aug. 26, 1994, at 1. The
report called for reforms in the selection of arbitrators and for improved oversight of the system. Id. In
addition, the study found that most NASD arbitrators were white men over the age of 60. Id.
While this study points out potential imperfections in the arbitral system, the same arguments could
be made about the civil court system. Attorneys for large local firms who routinely appear before local
judges could be termed "repeat players." Does this mean that local judges are inherently biased? In
addition, selection of judges for the civil courts, whether completed by appointment or election, does
not always ensure that the most neutral candidates are chosen. Finally, even if arbitrators are
disproportionately white males, how is this worse than the judicial system?
247. See EDR RULES, supra note 18, at 14 (rule 8(a)). Requiring arbitrators to be familiar with
employment law may often make an arbitrator more informed on the issues and the law, and thus more
competent to evaluate an employee's claims, than a judge. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 15,
at 376 (stating that "'[c]ourts aren't right more often than arbitrators and the parties because they are
wiser. They are 'right' because they have the final say.") (quoting James E. Westbrook, The End of
an Era in Arbitration: Where Can You Go If You Can't Go Home Again (unpublished manuscript,
1980)).
248. See EDR RULES, supra note 18, at 15 (rule 9).
249. For a discussion of the NYSE rules, see supra note 158 and accompanying text.
250. For example, assume the arbitrator, A, is a former attorney for law firm X, one of whose
clients is XYZ Corp. Further, assume that A defended XYZ Corp. in a tort suit while working for firm
X. B, an employee of XYZ Corp., is terminated and files an age discrimination claim against XYZ
Corp. A should be required to disclose his affiliation with firm X and should not be allowed to sit as
the arbitrator of B's dispute with XYZ Corp.
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remaining names in preferential order. The AAA would then appoint an
arbitrator from this list.
2. Evidence and Discovery
Although the judicial rules of evidence and discovery do not apply to
arbitration proceedings, an arbitrator should have the power to subpoena
witnesses or documents, either independently or at the request of a
party. t If parties agree to follow the EDR Rules, the arbitrator would
have these broad powers5 2 In addition, although the arbitrator's decision
to order production of documents should be discretionary, arbitrators should
always require employers to give employees access to all documents in
their individual employment file. Binding arbitrators to more rigid
evidentiary rules would make arbitration no different than a judicial
proceeding and take away the benefits of arbitration.253
3. The Opinion
Unlike judges, arbitrators generally do not issue lengthy opinions
explaining their decisions."' In part, this results from the fact that an
arbitrator's decision only binds the disputing parties. However, the law
permits arbitrators to look at relevant judicial precedent to analyze the legal
issues 5
251. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinldng.American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425,483 (1988).
Stipanowich proposed that the AAA Rules be amended to allow arbitrators to order discovery as they
deem it appropriate. Id. The EDR Rules promulgated by the AAA in 1993 grant powers to the arbitrator
similar to those outlined in the proposal. See EDR RULES, supra note 18, at 20 (rule 29(c)).
In Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. II. 1992), an Illinois District
Court dismissed the plaintiff's concern over inadequate discovery provisions. Id. at 1439. The court
noted that because the EDR Rules "authorize an arbitrator to subpoena witnesses and documents either
independently or upon request of either party," arbitration procedures are sufficient. Id.
252. See EDR RULES, supra note 18, at 20 (rule 29(c)).
253. For a discussion of the benefits of arbitration, see supra note 240-43 and accompanying text.
254. Both the California Arbitration Act and the NYSE require written decisions. Michele M. Buse,
Comment, Contracting Employment Disputes Out of the Jury System: An Analysis of the Implementation
of Binding Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace and Proposals to Reduce the Harsh Effects of a
Non-Appealable Award, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1485, 1537 n.385 (1995).
255. Critics assert that employment discrimination law will fail to develop if parties agree to
arbitrate discrimination claims because arbitrators do not issue opinions explaining their decisions. See
supra note 163. However, nothing prevents arbitrators from applying judicial precedent when deciding
cases. Further, arbitrating cases involving individual employment contracts would not remove all cases
from the courts because at-will employees and all employees bound by collective bargaining agreements
would continue to sue in judicial forums. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 (arguing that arbitration will not
hinder development of the law because most cases will still be decided in judicial forums).
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Even though an arbitrator's decision only binds the parties to the suit, the
arbitrator should be required to issue a detailed written opinion giving the
reasons for the decision. The EDR Rules require an award to be in writing
and signed by a majority of arbitrators resolving the dispute, but the
opinion may be given in summary form. 6 However, the employee's
interest in obtaining a detailed written opinion far outweighs the burden
such a requirement would impose on arbitrators. An opinion may be
necessary for courts to evaluate the merits of an appeal or determine
damages based on the arbitrator's resolution of the dispute.
25 7
C. The Arbitrator's Power to Award Damages
Generally, an arbitrator can award "any remedy or relief' he deems "just
and equitable" within the scope of the parties' agreement.258 In making
an award, an arbitrator also assesses fees and costs.29 Thus, in most
cases, arbitrators and judges enjoy equivalent powers to award damages. In
fact, studies demonstrate that arbitral awards are at least as great as judicial
awards, and arbitrators often award punitive damages. 2 ° Many empirical
studies conclude that arbitral awards in discrimination suits closely
resemble judicial decisions in similar disputes.26 These studies refute
concerns over plaintiffs' inability to recover damages in arbitration.
However, some state laws limit an arbitrator's ability to award some
forms of damages. 2 A New York law, for example, prohibits arbitrators
256. EDR RULES, supra note 18, at 20 (rule 29(c)).
257. In some states, arbitrators do not have the power to award damages. For a proposal on how
to handle damage awards under such restrictions, see infra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
258. EDR RULES, supra note 18, at 20 (rule 29(c)). Section 29(c) provides that "[t]he arbitrator may
grant any remedy or relief that [he] deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of
the parties, including, but not limited to, specific performance of the contract." Id.
259. Id. Section 29(c) also provides that "[tihe arbitrator... shall, in the award, assess arbitration
fees, expenses, and compensation ... in favor of any party and, in the event any administrative fees
or expenses are due the AAA, in favor of the AAA." Id.
260. See Michael Siconolfi, Blow to Brokers: Stock Investors Win More Punitive Awards in
Arbitration Cases, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1990, at Al.
261. See Deborah R. Willig, Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances: Arbitral and Judicial
Competence Compared, in ARBITRATION 1986: CURRENT AND EXPANDING ROLES, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 101 (Walter J.
Gershenfeld ed., 1987).
262. See, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794-97 (N.Y. 1976) (vacating an
arbitrator's award of punitive damages because enforcing such an award as a purely private remedy
would violate public policy); In re Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 584 N.Y.S.2d 483, 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(holding that arbitrators have no power to award punitive damages, even if agreed upon by the parties);
Kennewick Educ. Ass'n v. Kennewick Sch. Dist. No. 17, 666 P.2d 928, 930 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)
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from awarding exemplary damages.263 In states with such restrictions,
arbitrators should bifurcate the employee's claim. Once the arbitrator
resolves the liability issue, the arbitrator should send the case to a judicial
forum to determine damages.
D. Standards for Judicial Review
When parties agree to arbitrate their disputes, they also agree that the
arbitrator's resolution shall be binding.2" To allow the parties to seek
judicial review of an arbitrator's decision would frustrate the goals of
arbitration and establish the arbitral forum as tantamount to a lower court.
Although the employment dispute resolution rules do not address the issue,
the FAA adopts a strict standard for vacating an arbitrator's award.265 For
example, a court may vacate an arbitral award if there is evidence of fraud,
corruption, misconduct, or if the arbitrator exceeds her power.266 This
standard is sufficiently strict to uphold the parties' intent to be bound by
the arbitrator's decision, yet it allows for judicial review when the arbitrator
blatantly disregards the law. Thus, Congress should not amend the FAA to
adopt a more lenient standard for judicial review.
(concluding that "recovery of punitive damages is contrary to public policy ... unless expressly
authorized by statute"); School City of E. Chicago, Indiana v. East Chicago Fed'n of Teachers, Local
# 511, 422 N.E.2d 656, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (vacating arbitrators award of punitive damages as
contrary to public policy).
263. See Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1991) (vacating the punitive
damages award as beyond the authority of arbitrators under New York law and citing Garrity, 353
N.E.2d at 795); see also Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 584 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
264. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
265. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). The FAA provides the following standards for the vacation of an
arbitration award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award
to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators.
Id.
One commentator argues that courts have imputed astringent "manifest disregard" standard into § 10
of the FAA. See Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going With Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on
the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. L. U. PUB. L. REv. 203, 216-17 (1992). This standard
goes beyond "mere error, misinterpretation, misunderstanding, or misapplication of the law." Id.
266. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Gilmer extension parallels an increasing willingness on the part of
courts and Congress to allow parties to execute private agreements to
arbitrate their disputes. While Gilmer did not expressly condone the use of
arbitration agreements in individual employment contracts, both the
Supreme Court's strong presumption of arbitrability and the proposed
changes to rules governing the arbitration of employment disputes suggest
that the Gilmer extension is warranted.
Binding arbitration is an attractive alternative to litigation for resolving
employment discrimination claims. The proposed changes to arbitration
procedures allow parties to enjoy the benefits of arbitration and overcome
the perceived weaknesses in arbitration procedures.
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